The big ideas of data analysis and modeling, with the fine print
Twelve results that a working analyst should be able to derive, apply and distrust. Each comes with a lab that reproduces the result and then pushes on the assumption that makes it true: homoskedastic errors, a mechanism you can ignore, a validation set used once, a stable covariate distribution, independent rows, a parameter the data can actually pin down.
How to read this
Each idea has five parts. The statement gives the result in standard form. Why it's true sketches the derivation. Where it breaks covers the assumptions that fail in practice. Key references points to the primary literature. The lab simulates the setting so you can find the edge yourself.
The labs are small simulations run in your browser, with a fresh random draw each time. Constants are illustrative; the shapes are the point.
Leverage & influence
The hat matrix says which rows can move the fit, and masking hides them from one-at-a-time checks.
Collinearity & VIF
Coefficients become unstable while predictions along the data's own direction stay sharp.
Confounders, colliders & bad controls
Adjusting for the wrong variable can create the bias you were removing.
Heteroskedasticity & sandwich errors
Robust standard errors repair the coverage, up to a small-sample caveat.
Multiple imputation
Rubin's rules carry imputation uncertainty into the standard error. Single imputation hides it.
The winner's curse
The best of $K$ equal models looks better by about $\sigma\sqrt{2\ln K}$.
AIC, BIC & "best model"
One criterion predicts, the other is consistent, and you can't have both.
Calibration & proper scores
A model can rank perfectly and still lie about its probabilities.
Covariate shift
Importance weights fix the target distribution and cost you effective sample size.
Partial pooling
Groups borrow strength from each other, and rows in a group aren't independent evidence.
Autocorrelation
$n(1-\varphi)/(1+\varphi)$ effective observations, and intervals that undercover.
Identifiability & sloppy models
Two exponentials that are almost the same pin down neither rate.
What a regression assumes
Almost every method in applied work is a linear model in disguise. Four consequences of its algebra show up constantly: some rows matter more than others, correlated predictors share information, adjustment has a causal meaning, and the usual standard errors assume something about the noise.
Leverage, influence & the hat matrix
The diagonal of the hat matrix tells you how much each observation controls its own fitted value. A point with high leverage and a large residual moves the fit. Two such points side by side can hide each other.
Statement
For $y=X\beta+\varepsilon$ with $X\in\mathbb R^{n\times p}$, the fitted values are $\hat y=Hy$ with $H=X(X^\top X)^{-1}X^\top$. The leverage $h_{ii}=H_{ii}$ satisfies $1/n\le h_{ii}\le1$ and $\sum_i h_{ii}=p$. For simple regression $h_{ii}=\frac1n+\frac{(x_i-\bar x)^2}{S_{xx}}$. The residual variance is $\operatorname{Var}(e_i)=\sigma^2(1-h_{ii})$, and the influence of row $i$ on the coefficients is summarized by Cook's distance:
Why it's true
The Sherman–Morrison formula gives $(X_{(i)}^\top X_{(i)})^{-1}=(X^\top X)^{-1}+\frac{(X^\top X)^{-1}x_ix_i^\top(X^\top X)^{-1}}{1-h_{ii}}$, and substituting it into the normal equations gives the leave-one-out identity above without refitting. Since $H$ is an orthogonal projection, its trace equals its rank, $p$, so the average leverage is $p/n$. A point with $h_{ii}$ near 1 forces $\hat y_i\approx y_i$ whatever its residual would otherwise be, which is why its residual looks small.
Where it breaks
(i) Masking: two outliers in the same place each pull the line toward the other, so each one's leave-one-out change is modest and neither flags. The lab's "second point" box shows it. Leave-one-out diagnostics need leave-k-out or a high-breakdown fit (least trimmed squares, MM-estimators) to see them. (ii) The usual cutoffs, $h_{ii}>2p/n$ and $D_i>4/n$, are rules of thumb, not tests. (iii) Influence is relative to the model: a point that is influential under a line may be unremarkable under a curve, so check the specification before you check the points.
Key references
Hoaglin & Welsch, "The hat matrix in regression and ANOVA," Am. Stat. (1978); Cook, "Detection of influential observations in linear regression," Technometrics (1977); Belsley, Kuh & Welsch, Regression Diagnostics (1980); Rousseeuw & Leroy, Robust Regression and Outlier Detection (1987).
Collinearity & variance inflation
Correlated predictors inflate the variance of each coefficient by $1/(1-R_j^2)$. The individual estimates swing together and cancel, so predictions in the span of the data stay precise while the story told by the coefficients falls apart.
Statement
In the linear model with homoskedastic errors, the variance of the $j$-th OLS coefficient is
where $S_{jj}=\sum_i(x_{ij}-\bar x_j)^2$ and $R_j^2$ is the $R^2$ from regressing column $j$ on the other columns. Equivalently, the eigenvalues of $X^\top X$ set the variance in each direction: $\operatorname{Var}(v^\top\hat\beta)=\sigma^2\sum_k (v^\top u_k)^2/\lambda_k$.
Why it's true
By Frisch–Waugh–Lovell, $\hat\beta_j$ is the slope of $y$ on the part of $x_j$ not explained by the other columns. That residualized column has sum of squares $S_{jj}(1-R_j^2)$, and the slope's variance is $\sigma^2$ divided by that. A thin direction of the cloud has a small eigenvalue $\lambda_k$ and a large variance. Because the data barely vary along it, nothing there constrains the fit.
Where it breaks
(i) Collinearity is a statement about precision, not bias, and a large VIF with a large $n$ and a large effect can still give a tight interval. Goldberger's point, in his chapter on "micronumerosity," is that a small sample inflates variances just as collinearity does, yet nobody treats a small $n$ as a disease to be diagnosed. (ii) Predictions at points on the ridge of the training cloud are fine; predictions off the ridge extrapolate along a direction with no data, and their variance is $\sigma^2 x_0^\top(X^\top X)^{-1}x_0$, which explodes. (iii) Dropping one of two correlated predictors "to fix the VIF" trades variance for omitted-variable bias. Combining them, or ridge shrinkage, is usually better. (iv) The cutoff VIF > 10 has no theoretical basis.
Key references
Belsley, Conditioning Diagnostics (1991); Goldberger, A Course in Econometrics (1991), ch. 23; O'Brien, "A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance inflation factors," Qual. Quant. (2007); Hoerl & Kennard, "Ridge regression," Technometrics (1970).
Confounders, colliders & bad controls
"Control for everything" isn't a strategy. Adjusting for a common cause removes bias, adjusting for a common effect creates it, and adjusting for a mediator changes the question.
Statement
Let $X$ be an exposure, $Y$ an outcome and $Z$ a third variable. A set $Z$ identifies the total effect of $X$ on $Y$ by adjustment if it satisfies the backdoor criterion: it blocks every path from $X$ to $Y$ that starts with an arrow into $X$, and contains no descendant of $X$. Three canonical roles:
Why it's true
Conditioning on $Z$ blocks a path through a non-collider and opens a path through a collider. If $X$ and $Y$ are independent causes of $Z$, then among units with the same $Z$, a high $X$ implies a low $Y$: this is Berkson's bias, and in a regression it appears as a nonzero coefficient on $X$ where there's no effect. Adjusting for a mediator removes the part of the effect that travels through it, leaving only the direct effect.
Where it breaks
(i) The causal diagram is an assumption, and the data can't confirm it: the same joint distribution is compatible with confounder and collider structures. (ii) Selection into the sample, such as hospitalized patients only or a published study, is conditioning on a collider that you didn't choose. (iii) Coefficients on the controls aren't interpretable as effects. Westreich and Greenland called reading them that way the "Table 2 fallacy." (iv) Adjusting for a noisy proxy of a confounder removes only part of the bias (idea 4 of the intro edition).
Key references
Berkson, "Limitations of the application of fourfold table analysis to hospital data," Biometrics Bull. (1946); Pearl, Causality (2009); Hernán, Hernández-Díaz & Robins, "A structural approach to selection bias," Epidemiology (2004); Westreich & Greenland, "The Table 2 fallacy," Am. J. Epidemiol. (2013); Cinelli, Forney & Pearl, "A crash course in good and bad controls," Sociol. Methods Res. (2022).
Heteroskedasticity & sandwich standard errors
When the noise level depends on the predictors, OLS is still unbiased but its textbook standard error is wrong. The sandwich estimator fixes the asymptotics and, with a leverage correction, most of the small-sample behavior.
Statement
If $\operatorname{Var}(\varepsilon_i)=\sigma_i^2$, the exact covariance of the OLS estimator is $(X^\top X)^{-1}X^\top\Omega X(X^\top X)^{-1}$ with $\Omega=\operatorname{diag}(\sigma_i^2)$, not $\sigma^2(X^\top X)^{-1}$. White's estimator replaces $\sigma_i^2$ with squared residuals:
Why it's true
The middle matrix $\sum_i\sigma_i^2x_ix_i^\top$ is estimated by $\sum_i e_i^2x_ix_i^\top$. Each $e_i^2$ is a poor estimate of its own $\sigma_i^2$, but the sum averages the errors out, so $\frac1n\sum e_i^2x_ix_i^\top\to\frac1n\sum\sigma_i^2x_ix_i^\top$ and the sandwich is consistent whatever the form of $\sigma_i^2$. Residuals are shrunk by $\sqrt{1-h_{ii}}$ (idea 1), so $e_i^2$ underestimates $\sigma_i^2$ most where leverage is high. HC3 divides that out and is approximately the jackknife variance.
Where it breaks
(i) Small $n$ with high-leverage points: HC0 undercovers, sometimes badly, and HC3 is the safer default (MacKinnon & White; Long & Ervin). (ii) It corrects the variance only. If the mean function is wrong, the target is the best linear approximation under the sampling distribution, which shifts when that distribution changes. King and Roberts argue that a gap between robust and classical errors is a symptom of misspecification worth investigating, not just a nuisance to patch. (iii) It assumes independent rows. Clustered or autocorrelated data need cluster-robust or HAC versions (ideas 10 and 11).
Key references
Eicker, Ann. Math. Stat. (1963); Huber, Proc. 5th Berkeley Symp. (1967); White, "A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator," Econometrica (1980); MacKinnon & White, J. Econometrics (1985); Long & Ervin, Am. Stat. (2000); King & Roberts, "How robust standard errors expose methodological problems they do not fix," Polit. Anal. (2015).
Missing data & selection
The sample you analyze has already been filtered by who responded, which model won, and which score looked best. These three ideas are about quantifying the uncertainty that the filtering adds, so it isn't silently dropped.
Multiple imputation & Rubin's rules
Filling a hole once treats a guess as data. Filling it $m$ times with draws from the predictive distribution, then pooling, carries the uncertainty about the hole into the final standard error.
Statement
Create $m$ completed data sets by drawing the missing values from their posterior predictive distribution, estimate $\hat Q_k$ and its variance $U_k$ in each, and combine:
Intervals use a $t$ distribution with $\nu=(m-1)\big(1+\bar U/((1+1/m)B)\big)^2$ degrees of freedom. The fraction of missing information is $\lambda\approx(1+1/m)B/T$.
Why it's true
Total variance splits into within- and between-imputation parts: $\operatorname{Var}(\hat Q)=E[\operatorname{Var}(\hat Q\mid Y_{\rm obs},Y_{\rm mis})]+\operatorname{Var}(E[\hat Q\mid Y_{\rm obs},Y_{\rm mis}])$. The first term is $\bar U$, and the second is the spread of the estimate across plausible fills, $B$. A single imputation has $B=0$ by construction. Mean or regression imputation also distorts the relationship: the filled values sit exactly on the prediction line, so correlations are inflated or deflated and the variance of the variable is understated.
Where it breaks
(i) The imputation model has to be congenial with the analysis: include the outcome, and every interaction or nonlinearity the analysis will use, or those relationships are imputed away (Meng, 1994). (ii) Draws must reflect parameter uncertainty, not just residual noise (the lab bootstraps for this). (iii) Everything rests on MAR, which can't be tested from the observed data. For MNAR, report a sensitivity analysis by shifting the imputed values by $\delta$ and watching the estimate move. (iv) With $m$ small, the Monte Carlo error in $B$ matters. $m\approx\lambda\cdot 100$ is a common rule.
Key references
Rubin, Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys (1987); Little & Rubin, Statistical Analysis with Missing Data (3rd ed., 2019); Meng, "Multiple-imputation inferences with uncongenial sources of input," Stat. Sci. (1994); Sterne et al., BMJ (2009); van Buuren, Flexible Imputation of Missing Data (2nd ed., 2018).
The winner's curse in model selection
Pick the best of $K$ models on a validation set and its score is optimistic, even if every candidate is equally good. The bias grows like $\sigma\sqrt{2\ln K}$.
Statement
Suppose $K$ candidates have validation scores $\hat s_k=s_k+\sigma\xi_k$ with $\xi_k$ i.i.d. standard normal. The selected score $\max_k\hat s_k$ is biased upward relative to the true score $s_{k^*}$ of the model it picked. When all $s_k$ are equal,
Why it's true
The maximum of $K$ standard normals concentrates near $\sqrt{2\ln K}$, because the tail $\Pr[\xi>t]\approx e^{-t^2/2}$ hits $1/K$ there. The selected model's true score hasn't changed, only its observed score. If the candidates differ, selection still picks a mixture of real quality and luck, and the luck component is positive on average.
Where it breaks
(i) Candidates that are strongly correlated, such as nearby hyperparameter settings, don't offer $K$ independent chances, so the effective $K$ is smaller. (ii) Reuse is the same mechanism in slow motion: each look at the held-out set to decide what to try next adds a selection step, so a test set consulted repeatedly becomes a validation set. Dwork et al. quantify this adaptive overfitting, and Roelofs et al. found that on public Kaggle leaderboards the effect was smaller than feared. (iii) The one-standard-error rule, nested cross-validation and an untouched final test set are the usual guards, and none is free: nested CV costs $K\times$ more fits.
Key references
Cawley & Talbot, "On over-fitting in model selection and subsequent selection bias in performance evaluation," JMLR (2010); Varma & Simon, BMC Bioinformatics (2006); Dwork et al., "The reusable holdout," Science (2015); Roelofs et al., "A meta-analysis of overfitting in machine learning," NeurIPS (2019).
AIC, BIC & what "best model" means
AIC targets predictive accuracy and BIC targets the true model. When the truth is in the candidate set, BIC finds it as $n$ grows and AIC keeps overfitting. When it isn't, AIC is the better predictor.
Statement
For a model with $k$ parameters and maximized log-likelihood $\hat\ell$ on $n$ observations,
For Gaussian regression, $-2\hat\ell=n\ln(\mathrm{RSS}/n)+\text{const}$. AIC is asymptotically equivalent to leave-one-out cross-validation (Stone, 1977) and is asymptotically efficient: it picks the candidate with the lowest prediction error. BIC is consistent: if the true model is among the candidates it is selected with probability tending to 1. AIC isn't consistent, because with probability bounded away from 0 it selects an over-large nested model.
Why it's true
The optimism of a maximized log-likelihood as an estimate of expected out-of-sample log-likelihood is $k$ in regular models, which gives the $2k$. BIC arises from a Laplace approximation to the log marginal likelihood, $\ln p(y\mid M)\approx\hat\ell-\frac k2\ln n$. Adding a spurious parameter raises $-2\hat\ell$ by a $\chi^2_1$ variable, and AIC's penalty of 2 is below the $\chi^2_1$ 95th percentile of 3.84, so it admits a useless parameter about 16% of the time, however large $n$ is. BIC's $\ln n$ eventually exceeds any fixed quantile.
Where it breaks
(i) Yang (2005) proved that no criterion can be both consistent and minimax-rate optimal for prediction, so "AIC or BIC" is a choice about the goal. (ii) With $k$ comparable to $n$, AIC is biased; use the corrected AICc. (iii) Both need a regular likelihood: for the number of mixture components or change points, the usual asymptotics fail. (iv) "The true model is in the set" is almost never literally true, which is the argument for AIC when you want predictions and for BIC when you want a parsimonious summary.
Key references
Akaike, IEEE Trans. Autom. Control (1974); Schwarz, Ann. Stat. (1978); Stone, JRSS B (1977); Burnham & Anderson, Model Selection and Multimodel Inference (2002); Yang, "Can the strengths of AIC and BIC be shared?" Biometrika (2005); Claeskens & Hjort, Model Selection and Model Averaging (2008).
Prediction in practice
A deployed model is judged by whether its numbers can be used and whether they hold up when the world differs from the training set. Both depend on assumptions that standard accuracy metrics don't check.
Calibration & proper scoring rules
Ranking quality and probability quality are different. A strictly proper score rewards honest probabilities, and AUC and accuracy don't see miscalibration at all.
Statement
A scoring rule $S(p,y)$ is proper if the expected score is optimized by reporting the true probability, and strictly proper if only by it. The Brier score $(p-y)^2$ and the log score $-\log p_y$ are strictly proper. A predictor is calibrated if $\Pr[Y=1\mid \hat p=p]=p$ for all $p$. Murphy's decomposition of the Brier score is
Why it's true
Condition on $\hat p$: $\mathbb E[(\hat p-Y)^2\mid\hat p]=(\hat p-\pi)^2+\pi(1-\pi)$, minimized at $\hat p=\pi$, which is propriety and the reliability term. Any strictly increasing transform of $\hat p$ leaves the ranking, and so AUC and the best-threshold accuracy, unchanged, while moving reliability. A predictor can therefore have an AUC of 0.95 and say "99%" when it's right 80% of the time.
Where it breaks
(i) The binned reliability diagram and the expected calibration error depend on the binning and have sizable bias at small $n$. Prefer smooth calibration curves and report the Brier or log score with an interval. (ii) Recalibration (Platt scaling, isotonic regression) fixes miscalibration in-distribution on held-out data, and it can't fix a model whose ranking is poor. (iii) Calibration is not stable under shift (idea 9): a model calibrated on one hospital's patients is often over- or under-confident at another. (iv) Calibration doesn't imply usefulness. Predicting the base rate for everyone is perfectly calibrated and has no resolution.
Key references
Brier, Mon. Weather Rev. (1950); Murphy, "A new vector partition of the probability score," J. Appl. Meteorol. (1973); Gneiting & Raftery, "Strictly proper scoring rules, prediction, and estimation," JASA (2007); Guo et al., "On calibration of modern neural networks," ICML (2017); Van Calster et al., "Calibration: the Achilles heel of predictive analytics," BMC Med. (2019).
Covariate shift & importance weighting
If only the distribution of inputs changes and the model is wrong, the best-fitting line moves. Reweighting by the density ratio recovers the target-population fit and pays for it in effective sample size.
Statement
Let training inputs follow $p(x)$ and deployment inputs $q(x)$, with $p(y\mid x)$ unchanged. For any loss $\ell$,
so the weighted training loss is an unbiased estimate of deployment loss. The price is variance: the effective sample size is $n_{\rm eff}=(\sum w_i)^2/\sum w_i^2$.
Why it's true
This is the change-of-measure identity, valid when $q\ll p$. If the model class contains the truth, both the weighted and unweighted fits are consistent for it and weighting only costs variance. If the model is misspecified, the unweighted fit minimizes error where the training data are dense, not where the deployment data are, and the two best-in-class fits differ (Shimodaira, 2000). Weighting trades that bias for variance.
Where it breaks
(i) Overlap: where $p(x)=0$ and $q(x)>0$ no weighting helps, and nearly-zero $p$ gives enormous weights. (ii) $w$ must be estimated, typically with a probabilistic classifier of train versus deployment, and errors in $\hat w$ are amplified. (iii) Only $p(x)$ may have changed. If $p(y\mid x)$ moved (concept drift) or $p(y)$ moved with $p(x\mid y)$ fixed (label shift, which needs a different correction), this fix is wrong. (iv) Clipping weights reduces variance and reintroduces bias; the lab shows the trade.
Key references
Shimodaira, "Improving predictive inference under covariate shift by weighting the log-likelihood function," JSPI (2000); Sugiyama & Kawanabe, Machine Learning in Non-Stationary Environments (2012); Quiñonero-Candela et al., Dataset Shift in Machine Learning (2009); Lipton, Wang & Smola, "Detecting and correcting for label shift," ICML (2018).
Dependence & identifiability
Rows aren't always independent pieces of evidence, and parameters aren't always separately learnable from the data. The last three ideas count the information in a data set honestly.
Partial pooling & clustered data
Estimating many group means separately is noisy, and pooling them all together ignores real differences. A hierarchical model shrinks each group toward the overall mean by exactly as much as the data justify.
Statement
For $y_{ij}=\theta_j+\varepsilon_{ij}$ with $\theta_j\sim N(\mu,\tau^2)$ and $\varepsilon_{ij}\sim N(0,\sigma^2)$, the posterior mean (BLUP) of group $j$ with $n_j$ observations is
The intraclass correlation is $\rho=\tau^2/(\tau^2+\sigma^2)$, and a cluster of size $m$ carries the information of $m/(1+(m-1)\rho)$ independent observations (the design effect is $1+(m-1)\rho$).
Why it's true
$\bar y_j$ is an unbiased but noisy estimate with variance $\sigma^2/n_j$, and the prior says $\theta_j$ is near $\mu$ with variance $\tau^2$. The precision-weighted combination has weights proportional to the reciprocal variances, which gives $B_j$. Groups with little data (large $\sigma^2/n_j$) are shrunk heavily and groups with lots of data are barely moved. For $J\ge4$ groups, this has lower total squared error than the separate means whatever the true $\theta_j$ (Stein; Efron & Morris, 1975).
Where it breaks
(i) $\tau^2$ is estimated from the spread of $J$ group means, so with few groups (below about 5 to 10) it is poorly determined and the shrinkage is wrong. (ii) The model treats groups as exchangeable. If group effects correlate with a group-level predictor, the random-effects estimate of that predictor's effect is biased (Mundlak; the Hausman test). (iii) Ignoring the clustering altogether, so-called pseudoreplication, treats $N$ rows as $N$ independent facts when there are only $J$ groups' worth. Hurlbert (1984) found it rampant in ecology, and the confidence intervals are too narrow by $\sqrt{\text{design effect}}$.
Key references
Efron & Morris, "Data analysis using Stein's estimator and its generalizations," JASA (1975); Gelman & Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models (2007); Hurlbert, "Pseudoreplication and the design of ecological field experiments," Ecol. Monogr. (1984); Bates et al., "Fitting linear mixed-effects models using lme4," J. Stat. Softw. (2015).
Autocorrelation & effective sample size
Positively correlated errors carry less information than the same number of independent ones. Using the iid standard error then gives intervals that are too narrow by $\sqrt{(1+\varphi)/(1-\varphi)}$.
Statement
For a stationary series with autocorrelations $\rho_k$, the variance of the sample mean is
Why it's true
Covariance between observations $k$ apart adds $2\rho_k\sigma^2/n$ for each lag to the variance. For AR(1), $\rho_k=\varphi^k$ and the geometric sum gives the factor above. With $\varphi=0.8$, $n_{\rm eff}=n/9$: a thousand daily observations are worth a hundred independent ones. Negative autocorrelation does the reverse, so alternating series are more informative about their mean.
Where it breaks
(i) $\varphi$ is itself estimated, with a downward bias in short series, so the correction is itself too optimistic exactly when it matters most. (ii) Heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) estimators avoid specifying a model but need a bandwidth, and their small-sample coverage is poor (Newey–West, Andrews; fixed-$b$ asymptotics of Kiefer–Vogelsang help). (iii) The same logic covers spatial and network dependence. (iv) Random cross-validation on dependent data leaks neighbors across the split. Use blocked or leave-one-cluster-out validation (Roberts et al., 2017).
Key references
Box, Jenkins & Reinsel, Time Series Analysis (4th ed., 2008); Newey & West, Econometrica (1987); Andrews, Econometrica (1991); Kiefer & Vogelsang, Econometrica (2005); Roberts et al., "Cross-validation strategies for data with temporal, spatial, hierarchical, or phylogenetic structure," Ecography (2017).
Identifiability & sloppy models
A model can fit beautifully while some parameters are barely constrained. The profile likelihood shows how far a parameter can move before the fit degrades, and for a sum of two close exponentials, that is very far.
Statement
A parameter is structurally identifiable if different values give different distributions of the data, and practically identifiable if the data at hand can distinguish them. Practical identifiability is read from the profile likelihood:
For a model with Jacobian $J$, the Fisher information $J^\top J/\sigma^2$ having eigenvalues spread across many orders of magnitude is the signature of a sloppy model (Brown & Sethna, 2003).
Why it's true
In $y=Ae^{-k_1t}+Be^{-k_2t}$ the two columns $\partial y/\partial k_1$ and $\partial y/\partial k_2$ become nearly parallel as $k_2\to k_1$, so $J^\top J$ is nearly singular and the curvature of the likelihood along the corresponding direction is tiny. The likelihood is flat along a ridge: raising $k_2$ while lowering $A$ and $B$'s balance leaves the curve almost unchanged. Moving along the ridge costs little in $\ell$, so the profile interval is wide.
Where it breaks
(i) Wald intervals from the Hessian are symmetric by construction and misleading when the likelihood is skewed, as it is here, and can even include impossible values. Profile intervals respect the shape. (ii) A model can be identifiable in principle and not in practice: noise, sampling times and the range of the experiment all matter, and more precise data at the same times may not help. (iii) A good fit is not evidence that the parameters are right. In sloppy models, many different parameter sets reproduce the data, and predictions in new regimes can differ widely.
Key references
Brown & Sethna, "Statistical mechanical approaches to models with many poorly known parameters," Phys. Rev. E (2003); Raue et al., "Structural and practical identifiability analysis of partially observed dynamical models by exploiting the profile likelihood," Bioinformatics (2009); Transtrum et al., "Perspective: sloppiness and emergent theories in physics, biology, and beyond," J. Chem. Phys. (2015); Lanczos, Applied Analysis (1956), for the two-exponential problem.
Four threads through the twelve
Everything runs through $(X^\top X)^{-1}$
Leverage, variance inflation and the sandwich (ideas 1, 2, 4) are one matrix viewed three ways. Which rows matter, which directions are thin and where the noise concentrates all read off it.
Ignore a mechanism and it biases you
Colliders, missingness and covariate shift (ideas 3, 5, 9) are cases where how the data got to you carries information. The fix is to model the mechanism, and it costs variance.
Selection inflates what it selects
The winner's curse, information criteria and calibration (ideas 6, 7, 8) show that choosing by a noisy score makes the score optimistic. Keep a decision's evidence separate from the data that made the decision.
There are fewer facts than rows
Collinearity, clusters, autocorrelation and ridges in the likelihood (ideas 2, 10, 11, 12) all mean that rows are worth less than one independent observation each. Count the information, and report intervals that reflect it.
A reading list
- A. Gelman, J. Hill & A. Vehtari, Regression and Other Stories (2020), and Gelman & Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models (2007). Practice-first treatments of ideas 1–4 and 10.
- T. Hastie, R. Tibshirani & J. Friedman, The Elements of Statistical Learning (2nd ed., 2009; free online). Selection, validation, ridge and the optimism of training error.
- R. Little & D. Rubin, Statistical Analysis with Missing Data (3rd ed., 2019), and S. van Buuren, Flexible Imputation of Missing Data (2nd ed., 2018; free online).
- M. Hernán & J. Robins, Causal Inference: What If (2020; free online). Confounding, selection bias and adjustment in one framework.
- K. Burnham & D. Anderson, Model Selection and Multimodel Inference (2nd ed., 2002), and D. Belsley, E. Kuh & R. Welsch, Regression Diagnostics (1980).
- B. Efron & T. Hastie, Computer Age Statistical Inference (2016; free online). The modern view of shrinkage, prediction error and selection.